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THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
TORTS. WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION AGAINST SALOON KEEPER BY WIDOW AND
CHILDREN
The decision in the case of Cole v. Rush,' should be of interest to all tavern
owners. In this case the Supreme Court of California reversed a prior decision by
the Superior Court, Los Angeles County, and held a tavern owner and the bar-
tender liable for the wrongful death of the plaintiff's husband and father.
The action was instituted by the widow and minor children of the decedent
to recover damages for loss of comfort and support, suffered by them because of
the "wrongful death" of their husband and father. It was alleged that on Octo-
ber 13, 1950, James Bernard Cole was a patron of the Tropic Isle Cafe. This cafe
was owned by the defendant who sold and furnished to Cole alcoholic beverages
which Cole drank. Prior to going on the defendant's premises Cole was not intoxi-
cated. After he drank the beverages furnished to him he became intoxicated. Plain-
tiffs alleged that defendant well knew that Cole was normally of quiet demeanor,
but that when intoxicated, he became belligerent, pugnacious, and quarrelsome.
Prior to the date in question, plaintiff, Dorothea Cole, had requested defendant
not to give, sell, or furnish intoxicating beverages to Cole in a sufficient quantity
to allow him to become intoxicated. It was alleged that because of such intoxication
on the day in question, and as a proximate result of the liquor sold to him, Cole
became belligerent, pugnacious, and quarrelsome, and engaged in fisticuffs with
one Franklin Leonard. Cole was struck by Leonard and fell to the pavement, strik-
ing his head against the concrete. The fall caused a subarachnoid hemorrhage from
which Cole died immediately
California has no civil damage, or Dramshop Act. These acts provide in sub-
stance for" liability on the part of persons selling or giving away intoxicating
beverages to any person who shall sustain injury or damage to his person, prop-
ertv, or means of support in consequence of or on account of intoxication ",2
The case presents several questions: Whether, at common law, the surviving
spouse and children of a decedent has a cause of action against one who, with
notice, sells intoxicating beverages to a patron? Whether the selling, or the drink-
ing, of the liquor is the proximate cause of subsequent injuries? Finally, whether
the common law drug rule should be applied to these facts?
Since California has no civil damage, or Dramshop Act the common law rule
is in effect. The common law gives no remedy for injury or death following the
mere sale of liquor to the ordinary man. No liability is imposed on the seller for
damages resulting from the intoxication of customers.3 Therefore, it would seem
to follow, that if such a customer were killed, his survivors could not recover.
4
The cases relied upon by the plaintiffs are distinguishable from the case under
1 271 P.2d 47, 42 A.C. 895 (rehearing granted).
2 30 Af. JUR. 612.
3 Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal.App.2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949), Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal.
App.2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (1943), Lammers v Pacific Electric Ry Co., 186 Cal. 379, 199 Pac.
523 (1921), Howlett v Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708, 6 A.L.R.2d 790 (1949), Tarwater
v Atlanta Co. Inc., 176 Tenn. 510, 144 S.W.2d 746 (1940), 48 C.J.S., Intoxicating Liquors
§§ 430-431, 30 Am. JUR., Intoxicating Liquors, § 607
4 Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, 212 S.C. 485, 48 S.E.2d 324, 11 A.L.R.2d 745 (1948) (bar-
biturate sale), Demge v. Feierstem, 222 Wis. 199, 268 N.W 210 (1936) (liquor sale), 30 Am.
JUR., Intoxicating Liquors § 610; 8 CAL. JUR. 988-989.
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present discussion. 5 This line of cases is the exception to the common law rule of
non-liability, and liability is predicated on the fact that the saloonkeeper does not
use reasonable care in maintaining order for the safety of his guests.
In the case of Pratt v. Daly,6 also relied on by the Coles, the plaintiff's wife
was permitted to recover damages resulting from defendant's sale of intoxicating
liquor to her husband when the defendant had knowledge of the fact that the hus-
band was a habitual drunkard. The court said, " it is incumbent upon the
plaintiff to prove that to the knowledge of the defendant such a stage (lack of
volition towards intoxicants) has been reached, by the consumer. .1
The plaintiff can not obligate the defendant to refuse to sell the deceased any
products authorized by his license. Under California Civil Code Section 51, the
defendant is under obligation by penalty of fine to sell to the deceased prior to
the time of violating the law. Violating the law in the instant case would occur
upon serving alcoholic beverages to an "obviously intoxicated person."8 It was
not shown by the plaintiffs that Cole was "obviously intoxicated" at the time of
the sale.
In order for the plaintiffs to recover the defendant's act must be the proximate
cause of the injury 9 There are cases holding that it is the consumption of the
liquor by the inebriate and not the sale which is the proximate cause of the injury 10
In the case of Reinhardt v. Fritzcke," the court said, "A widow or child, at
common law, could recover no damages because of the death of a husband or
father resulting from the consumption of intoxicating drinks, although they might
both suffer by reason thereof in their means of support."' 2 In the decision of King
v. Henkte,13 the court stated, "Had it not been for the drinking of the liquor after
the sale, which was a secondary or intervening cause coperating to produce the
fatal result, and was the act of the deceased, not of the defendants, the sale itself
would have proved entirely harmless. Hence it cannot be said that the wrongful act
of the defendants in making the sale of the liquor caused the death, but rather, his
own act in drinking it."' 4
The term "wrongful act" as used in California Civil Code Section 377, allow-
ing recovery for wrongful death by heirs or personal representatives, has been held
to contemplate an act wilfully or negligently directed against the person and there-
fore does not include a sale of liquor. The rule is stated in Britton v. Samuels,15
where the court said, "The proximate cause of the death, therefore, was not the
wrongful or unlawful act (sale of liquor) complained of."'1 It has never been held
5 Cherbonmer v. Rafalovich, 88 Minn. 307, 92 N.W 1124, 60 L.R.A. 773 (1903), Peck
v. Gerber, 154 Or. 126, 59 P.2d 675, 106 A.L.R. 996 (1936).
6 55 Anz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940).
7 See note 6 supra at 539, 104 P.2d at 151.
8 CALIF. STATS. 1935 (Alcoholic Beverage Act) Act 3796, p.1123.
9 30 Am. JuR., Intoxtcating Liquor § 611.
1o King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505, 60 Am. Rep. 119 (1886), Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 54,
288 N.W. 774, 6 N.C.C.A. (xs.) 629 (1939), 130 A.L.R. 357, 358 (1941), 30 Am. JuR., In-
toxicating Liquors § 611.
11 Remhardt v. Fritzche, 69 Hun. 565, 23 N.Y.S. 958, 130 A.L.R. 365 (1893).
12 See note 11 supra at 569, 23 N.Y.S. at 960.
1 King v. Henkie, supra note 10.
14 See note 13 supra at 510, 60 Am. Rep. at 122.
15 Britton v. Samuels, 143 Ky. 129, 136 S.W 143, 34 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1036 (1911), 30 Am.
Jun., Intoxcating Liquor, Effect of General Death Act § 610.
16 See note 15 supra at 130, 136 S.W. at 144.
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that the sale of liquor is culpable negligence which would impose legal liability for
damages upon the vendor or donor.'
7
The court in the instant case, deciding for the plaintiff, based part of its de-
cision on the following reasoning. That the proximate cause of an injury is the
original act even though the act of a third person intervenes, if a person of ordinary
prudence could reasonably anticipate the probability of the third person's inter-
vening conduct. The intervention of the independent act of a third party, between
the wrong complained of and the injury sustained, breaks the causal connection
if the intervening act was the direct or immediate cause of the injury Conse-
quently, in such a case, there can be no recovery except as against the person
whose immediate agency produced the injury 18 It has been held that the intoxi-
cation is not the proximate cause of death of. or injury to, an intoxicated person
caused by another person who is insulted or menaced by the intoxicated person.' 9
The court in the case under discussion felt, by a narrow margin of four to
three, that the act of the defendant, the selling of the liquor, and the act of the
deceased, the drinking of the liquor, merged into one act and became the act of
the defendant, thus rendering the defendant liable for the subsequent injuries.
"There is general agreement that the deceased's contributory negligence, assump-
tion of risk, or consent to the defendant's conduct will defeat recovery for his
death "20 Granting that the defendant was guilty of actionable negligence in
serving decedent the drink that made him intoxicated, decedent was equally guilty
of negligence in drinking it.- In some instances at least, the contributory negli-
gence is imputable to the plaintiff and prevents recovery against the vendor.
22
In Fleckner v. Dtonne,',3 the defendant tavernkeeper knew that Dionne was a
minor and sold the liquors to him while he was already under the "severe influence
of intoxicating liquors." He knew also that Dionne had upon or near the premises
an automobile and would thereafter drive. Injury did occur from an automobile
accident in which Dionne was at fault. The court held for the defendant, even
though it would seem that the bartender's knowledge of the possible consequences
of his actions was much more specific and extensive in the Fleckner case than in
the case under comment. The court in this case relied upon Hitson v. Dwyer"4 and
Lammers v. Pactfic Electric Ry. Co.25 In the Hitson case it was held that the
proximate cause of the injury was the drinking of the liquor rather than the wrong-
ful sale thereof to an obviously intoxicated person. Thus in the Fleckner case
where the possibility of harm was apparent, recovery was denied. But in the Cole
case, where it was only alleged that the defendant was informed of the belligerent
disposition of the deceased when he was intoxicated, recovery was allowed. Logi-
cally the decicions are not consistent.
At common law, it was held that a wife could bnng an action for "wrongful
death" against one who sold habit-forming drugs to a husband with knowledge
17 Cruse v Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73, 3 L.R.A. 327 (1889).
18 Schmidt v Mitchell, 84 Ill. 195, 25 Am. Rep. 446 (1876), 30 Am. JuR., Intoxicating
Liquor, Intervening Wrongful Act § 623.
19 Shugart v. Egan, 83 Ill. 56, 25 Am. Rep. 359 (1876).
'0 PROSSER, TORTS 966.
21 130 A.L.R. 359.
22 130 A.L.R. 358.
23 Fleckner v Dionne, supra note 3.
24 Hitson v. Dwyer, supra note 3.
25 Lammers v Pacific Electric Ry Co., supra note 3.
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that the drug was intended to satisfy a craving induced by habitual use.26 The
court in the instant case based part of the decision on the reasoning that it would
be illogical to hold because one substance is a drug in the technical sense of the
term, and another is a liquor, different rules should apply Therefore, under the
application of the common law drug rule the wife and children could bring this
action for "wrongful death" for the loss of consortium and support. Yet, the plain-
tiffs in the instant case alleged no such lack of volition. That is, it was not alleged
that the deceased was an alcoholic or was a user of intoxicants to the point that
he could no longer control his habits with respect to such intoxicants. In order to
have a cause of action for which the plaintiffs could recover, the deceased must
have lost his volition and the defendants must have been informed of the lack of
such volition. At common law there could be no recovery unless the seller was
aware of the purchaser's weakness. Thus, if this were the case, which it is not, the
plaintiffs could logically recover. As stated in Seibel v. Leackj "Courts may in
proper instances apply old rules to newly created conditions, but they can not
create new rules for conditions already regulated." 28 In the instant case, the plain-
tiffs sought to hold the defendants liable, in part, by trying to prove that the de-
fendant's act of selling liquor to the deceased was the proximate cause of the death.
This, in the light of the preceding discussion and cases cited relative to the dis-
cussion, is not possible logically
If it were held that liability could be imposed upon the vendor, under the com-
mon law drug rule, without showing that the decedent lacked volition, and that
the vendor had knowledge of this fact, it would place an unreasonable burden upon
the vendor. The plaintiffs did not prove or even attempt to prove this fact, but
alleged that deceased was an "able-bodied man." The defendant would be able to
sell the deceased drinks, but would have to determine at which point he should
refuse service. It is a matter of common knowledge that the amount or kind of
liquor which will cause intoxication vanes with drinkers and occasions. It has been
shown that even a medical doctor does not have this knowledge.29 It would seem
that such a responsibility can not logically be imposed.
It would appear that if the legislature wanted to hold the owners and bartend-
ers of taverns liable in such a case they would have revised the common law rule.
The fact remains that there has been no such revision. Therefore, in the absence
of affirmative legislation the common law rule of non-liability for tavern owners
for the sale of intoxicating liquor should be controlling in the instant case. It would
seem the Supreme Court was in error in overruling the lower court.
Daniel N Busby
2 6 Tidd v. Skinner, 225 N.Y. 442, 122 N.E. 247, 3 A.L.R. 1145 (1919) (morphine), Hoard
v. Peck, 56 Barb. 202 (N.Y. 1867), Holleman v. Harward, 119 N.C. 150, 25 S.E. 972 (1896),
Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio 327, 98 N.E. 102, 40 L.R.A. (N.s.) 360 (1912) (morphine),
Moberg v. Scott, 38 S.D. 442, 161 N.W. 998, L.R.A. 1917D, 732 (1917) (opium).
27 Seibel v. Leach, supra note 10.
28 See note 10 supra at 55, 288 N.W at 775.
29 SCIENcE NEws LETTER, October 11, 1952, p.223.
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